Advice for CV writing

1) State your name in large characters at the top of the CV, preferably in bold although not in a font size disproportionately big! No need to scare potential employers!

2) Provide your current address (if, like me, you have two or more different addresses, then state them all and the dates which you will be present at each address) and up to date contact details including both telephone and email! If you are using an email address which may be deemed inappropriate (for example, im-so-wasted@hotmail.com), it will be necessary to create a more professional account!

3) Your education should always be stated, although whether you provide both GCSE and A-level results is personal choice. I always provide both because you never know what the employer will be looking for. As a general rule, all information throughout the CV should be laid out as 'newest first' so put your most recent education at the top.

4) Your work experience should fall into three different categories: paid employment, voluntary work, and experience which is relevant to your professional field. Obviously if you do not have any experience fitting into one of these categories then omit it, although it may highlight a gap in your skills. Remember, never lie about what you've done but ensure that you do show off all skills that you learnt during different roles, without babbling!

5) Other interests may be used to fill out a CV, although if you're already on 2 sides of A4 then you might want to miss this part out. Interests can include hobbies you have which relate to your chosen professional field (e.g. regularly reading a particular newspaper or being part of a debate team) or those which are unrelated but show your character (e.g. sports or travelling). Try to avoid hobbies which won't show you in the best light or which are entirely irrelevant, like clubbing! Always note any musical instruments that you play and any grades you may have achieved in them, as this shows dedication and commitment.

6) References do not need to be provided, although if you wish to, the ideal number is 2. I personally choose to state that references are available on request, but note who they are available from. E.g. 'References are available on request from Joe Bloggs, Senior Lecturer at X University.'

Other general information - as with education, all work experience should be listed from the most recent to the oldest; font size of 11 or 12 is best and a font style such as Arial or Times New Roman; never lie about anything from grades to job roles as these may be discovered by reference checks or become obvious in interview. It may be worth attaching a covering letter to some applications where a CV is not enough, so ensure that both CV and cover letter are tailored to the employor that you're hoping to empress!

EU Law: Gender equality in the work place

The notion of gender equality was introduced by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The Treaty of Amsterdam quickly increased that power by introducing Article 19 TFEU on combating discrimination. The Charter of Fundamental Rights has also added additional protection for citizens.

Article 157 TFEU is currently the most influential provision governing gender equality, and stemmed from the Defrenne case, in which the French government were worried that they were at an economical disadvantage because their law was already enforcing equal pay for men and women, where other member states were not yet obliged to do so. Making Article 157 TFEU directly effective in all member states meant that not only were France back on par with the other member states, who now had to adhere to the EU provisions providing equal pay for men and women, but it also gave additional rights to women across Europe! Gender equality is now also governed by the Recast Directive 2006/54, the provisions of which largely previously existed in the form of 3 different equal treatment directives. Namely: equal pay, equal treatment and social security.

With regards discrimination in pay, Defrenne v Sabena demonstrated direct discrimination, whereas Jenkins demonstrated indirect discrimination. The Cadman case is worth noting although wasn’t a case of gender discrimination but of other discrimination in the work place. It established that paying longer-serving employees a higher wage than newer employees was discrimination where the difference in pay was not based on skills. Cadman set a precedent that all wages must be based on the skill set of the employee, as opposed to any other grounds such as gender or length of service.

The meaning of 'pay' has lead to some ambiguity as both direct and indirect forms of payment are now considered when evaluating any possible discrimination. Direct payment would be in the form of money. Indirect payment can include all the additional benefits provided by an employer in exchange for work. In Garland the court held that travel facilities constituted pay, thus when retired males were permitted to continue using their travel benefits but the women were not, it gave rise to discrimination. In Rinner-Kuhn the court established that sick pay constituted payment in kind. In Barber the court held that redundancy pay was also a form of payment, whether or not the person was voluntarily made redundant. In Gillespie the court said that maternity benefits were pay, although it’s important to note that there can be no comparator when the case involves pregnancy, for obvious reasons. In Bilka-Kaufhaus an occupational pension constituted payment.

The law on gender equality in the work place started off on equal pay for equal work, i.e. where the male and female were doing the exact same job but being paid differently. However, all legislation changes since the Treaty of Rome have extended this principle further, and now the EU is equally as concerned with ‘equal pay for work of equal value’. This means that the male and female do not need to be doing the same job but their contributions to their respective fields should be seen as equally weighted. Enderby, for example, concerned a pharmacist and a psychologist being paid different wages; the female counterpart claimed that she was being discriminated against as they were doing work of equal value. The court agreed that although the job tasks were different, they were doing equal value work. This may seem confusing because it’s so difficult to quantify the roles done in different professions and whether their contributions are ‘equal’, however, the NHS have adopted a system of ‘banding’ where this works surprisingly well. The employees of the NHS will be banded within their fields, depending on their level of expertise, so whilst some jobs (for example, a nursing assistant) may go in as a Band 1 and may only go up to a Band 4, others (for example, a surgeon) may go in at a Band 6 and go up to the highest level. One alternative case where the courts held it was legitimate to pay the male and female differently was Brunnhofer, in which two employees of a bank employed at the same time and in the same job category, fulfilled different roles and tasks. The male was paid more because his work involved more arduous tasks than his female counterpart. She claimed it was discrimination but the court disagreed.

The burden of proof always lies with the complainant to prove that she has been discriminated against. They must prove 1) they have been paid less, using a comparitor to prove this (e.g. female would use her male employee as the comparitor), and 2) they were doing work of equal value. It's worth noting that in Enderby the burden of proof shifted to the employer, which was an exception to the rule.

Criminal: Defenses to crime

Insanity must be distinguished from being ‘unfit to plead’ which is where the accused is incapable of understanding the charges during the trial. For insanity, the accused MUST BE FOUND INSANE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENCE.

If insanity is successful, the verdict will be = NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY

Applies to any offence which requires Mens Rea.

INSANITY IS CAUSED BY INTERNAL FACTORS e.g. Sullivan (kicked a man during an epileptic attack) or Burgess (sleepwalking). ANY EXTERNAL FACTORS = AUTOMATISM e.g. Quick (hypoglycaemia due to alcohol but no food).

M’Naghten Rules – arose from the M’Naghten case where D killed Prime Minister’s secretary. Every man is presumed sane until the contrary is proved.“It must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing he act the party accused was labouring under such a DEFECT OF REASON from DISEASE OF THE MIND as to not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that HE DID NOT KNOW IT WAS WRONG.”

Defect of reason – Clarke (theft from a shop whilst suffering depression) Ackner J – “deprived of the power of reasoning”

Disease of the mind – a condition affecting D’s mental faculties. Can be temporary, permanent, curable or incurable. Kemp (arteriosclerosis caused black outs, in which D beat wife with a hammer).

Automatism means you’re not in control of bodily actions despite being sane.

Lord Denning in Bratty said “Done by the muscles without any control by the mind”                                                                         e.g. reflex actions (Hill v Baxter)

Requirements: 1) Total absence of voluntary control over actions;

2) Due to external factor;

3) Was not self-induced

Mistake is not a defence on its own but commonly overlaps with self-defence (i.e. mistaken as to the need to defend oneself, as in Beckford – police shot and killed suspect because he feared attack)

Mistake of fact can negate Mens Rea: Morgan (told friends to have sex with his wife; were convicted because jury said not a true mistake). Williams Gladstone (believed attacking mugger but was actually a member of the public stopping crime)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Intoxication is only a defence where it causes D to lack Mens Rea (i.e. will still be guilty if Mens Rea is present).

Sheehan and Moore “drunken intent is still intent”

INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION – not liable (exception: Kingston drugged and locked in a room with young boy, still had the Mens Rea of indecent assault so was guilty)

VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION – will be guilty of crimes of basis intent (satisfied by recklessness) but not specific intent (satisfied by an intention). DPP v Majewski – committed various assaults whilst drunk and claimed he hadn’t known what he was doing but was held guilty.

Public policy reasoning – a person who chooses to intoxicate himself should be criminally answerable. Richardson and Irwin asked ‘would D would have foreseen the risk if sober?’

Dutch courage – Always guilty. Gallagher got drunk to gain confidence to kill his wife.

Self Defence is governed by s.76 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act

Covers defence of ONESELF, OTHER PEOPLE, PROPERTY and when PREVENTING CRIME.

Must only use necessary and reasonable force.

Necessary – Requires either D being attacked or under threat of attack. Honest but not reasonable belief as he is judged on the facts as he believed them to be (unless voluntarily intoxicated – O’Grady). There used to be a duty to retreat but Bird (woman was slapped by man so threw her drink in retaliation but accidently threw the glass too) changed the law.

Reasonable – only a jury can decide by putting themselves in the circumstances as D believed them to be. Palmer (during an attack, D will not have time to “weigh things to a nicety” but he will have acted reasonably where he did what he HONESTLY AND INSTINCTIVELY BELIEVED WAS NECESSARY).But Owino said that the amount of force used will be judged objectively (in Martin, D shot at burglars) because D isn’t entitled to use as much force as he wants!

Consent

Consent to harm: Brown (sadomasochistic acts, didn’t matter if consenting) was against public policy but some acts can be consented to such as legal sports and tattooing e.g. Wilson (branded buttocks).

Can consent to horseplay even where it’s really rough e.g. Aitken (RAF officers on fire)

Informed consent: Dica (HIV unprotected sex)

Consenting victim makes a mistake: Tabassum (pretended to be a medical professional doing cancer scans by feeling women’s breasts.

True consent: submission is not consent or is the fact that the victim doesn’t retreat (Day – 10 year old girl didn’t resist adult man)

Duress is where D is forced to break the law due to threats towards him or a person close to him.

D will accept that he had both Actus Reus and Mens Rea of the crimes.

The defence of duress is available to all crimes except murder. REFORM: The Law Commission has advised allowing duress of murder because of the problems that occur when D intends a GBH but accidentally kills. Or where D intends to kill but commits a GBH and can then use duress.

Duress may be by THREATS or by CIRCUMSTANCES. The rules are the same for both.

Requirements laid down in Graham: The answer to the following questions must be YES:

1) Was the accused, or may he have been, compelled to act as he did because, as a result of what he reasonably believed to be the situation, he had good cause to fear that otherwise death or serious injury would result to himself (or to someone close).

THREATS MUST HAVE BEEN OF DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY (physical rather than psychological – Baker and Wilkins)

2) Would a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing relevant characteristics of the accused, have responded as the accused did?

THIS WILL FAIL IF A SOBER PERSONAL OF REASONABLE FIRMNESS WOULD HAVE RESISTED. CHARACTERISTICS CAN BE AGE, SEX, DISABILITY ETC (drug addiction is self-induced so can’t be a characteristic – Flatt). BEING VULNERABLE DOESN’T COUNT – Horne.

The carrying out of any threats would have to be immediate or imminent. Hudson (two girls committed perjury (lied in court) because they were told they’d be cut up if they didn’t; duress succeeded because the man was in the court and could have carried out his threat later that day).

The threat must be the direct cause of the crime; Cole – moneylenders threatened unpleasant consequences if D did not pay the money so D robbed a bank; was not direct.

D cannot rely on duress if he exposed himself to the threats by joining a gang – Hasan.

Necessity will apply in circumstances which are so compelling, the defendant felt as though he ought to act in the way he did.

Will very rarely be allowed for murder cases. In Dudley and Stephens, members of a crew who had been starved of food and water for days decided to kill and eat the most vulnerable member of their crew. The defence of necessity was not allowed because the judge said that even if such a defence were permitted, who would be qualified to decide which life is more valuable than another.

HOWEVER, where fate has already ‘designated’ one individual for death, the defence of necessity may succeed.

Requirements: 1) The act must be needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil;

2) No more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved;

3) The evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided.

Re A satisfied all the requirements. Conjoined twins, one was capable of independent existence but the other was entirely dependent. Leaving them conjoined would result in the death of both babies, but separating them would mean ONE WOULD LIVE AND ONE WOULD DIE. The hospital sought advice from the court as the parents did not want the operation to go ahead. The hospital had conflicting duties; to save the stronger child’s life in carrying out the operation but also to prevent the weaker child’s death. Held that the operation would be lawful.

Criminal: Assault and Battery

The victim of an offence must be a person, not a corporation. The Draft Criminal Code (DCC) says: “a person who has been born and has an existence independent of his mother.”

Assault and Battery - Consolidated in s.39 Criminal Justice Act 1988; replaces the complex provisions in OAPA 1861.

Assault           “D intentionally or recklessly causes V to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence.” R v Ireland

                        Assault has been regarded as an attempted battery.

                               

                        Actus Reus

Immediacy: Ireland (silent phone calls), Constanza (stalked; court said she apprehended violence “at some time not excluding the immediate future”) and Smith (looking through V’s window to scare her while she’s in her night clothes; there can be no assault if V realises that D cannot carry out a battery e.g. other side of the glass).

Assault by words: Savage (words can negate actions – holding a sword but using language which makes clear that he won’t use it) and Constanza (words include writing, fax, email, tweet or text).

Mens Rea – intention or recklessness (Cunningham)

Battery          “D intentionally or recklessly inflicts unlawful personal violence upon V” Rolfe

                        Violence includes unlawful touching – Thomas (touching a person’s clothes whilst he is wearing them is equivalent to touching him). Supported by Art 8 ECHR Private life.

                        Lord Lane in Faulkner v Talbot – “...it need not be hostile or rude or aggressive” Result: HOSTILITY IS NOT AN INGREDIENT OF BATTERY.

                        Actus Reus

                        The victim does not need to be aware of the unlawful touching (e.g. asleep) and there does not need to have been an assault/fear of violence (e.g. hit from behind).

                       Omission: Santana-Bermudez (omitted to tell police officer about the syringe in his pocket before a search, the officer was stabbed by it; guilty).

                        Use of an instrument: Haystead (D punched woman who dropped baby), Murgatroyd (D set dog on V), Scott v Shephard (threw firework in a crowd which was then flung by a third party in an attempt to get it away from himself, no break in chain of causation).

                        Mens Rea – intention or recklessness (Cunningham)

The word ‘assault’ often refers to both an assault and a battery because there is no verb for battery; both come under the verb to be ‘assaulted’. Even the CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT refers to them both as common assaults. DPP v Little blurred the distinction further.

Defence of consent - can an assault or battery be consented to?

Pringle confirmed Collins v Willcock that day to day touching can be consented to by implication.

A-G’s ref No.6 of 1980 said can’t consent to street fighting because it was against public policy.

Brown confirmed A-G’s ref; sadomasochistic acts amounting to a battery were against public policy.

TEST FOR CONSENT: 1) was there consent? 2) was the act one that could be consented to?

Effective consent - Capacity: Mental Capacity Act 2005

Informed consent: Konzani had unprotected sex, knowing he was carrying HIV. Court said “she cannot give an informed consent to something of which she is ignorant”. But Dica established that true consent can be given to a risk of infection which is known about.

Contract: Exclusion Clauses

Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977

L’Estrange v Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394 – it was held that despite the print of the contract being tiny and difficult to read, because it had been signed it was still enforceable and the exclusion clause that it contained still had to be incorporated. LJ Scrutton said that the question of ‘notice’ was irrelevant in such cases. Scrutton states that where the contract is in a train ticket or other unsigned documents, it must be shown that the party privy to that contract could reasonably have been aware of the terms and conditions. However, where a document has been signed, it is not necessary to prove that said party is aware of the terms, even if they include some form of fraud or misrepresentation.

The only exception to this strict rule is where the signature is the result of fraud or misrepresentation. Curtis v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co Ltd [1951] 1 KB 805 is a case where the plaintiff took a dress to the dry cleaners. She was asked to sign a receipt on which there was a very wide exclusion clause. The plaintiff asked the assistant what this meant and was told that the dry cleaners would not be liable for any damage done to the beads or sequins on the dress – the plaintiff signed the contract. When the dress was later returned, it had a stain on it, and the dry cleaners used the exclusion clause to cover themselves but it was deemed by the court that the misrepresentation of the assistant had overridden whatever the clause said as those words were ultimately the reason the contract had been signed.

Non est factum – an argument that the party signing made a fundamental mistake about the nature of the document. This argument is rarely successful but it’s taken as conclusive evidence that when a party signs a document they are agreeing to the contract and all its terms.

In the case of contracts which are not signed, the courts have to examine what type of document it is contained in, as well as the reason for the clause, the steps that were taken to draw attention to it and its general nature. The following matters will be considered in turn:

-          Time: The party, who is affected by the clause, must have knowledge of said clause at the time the contact was entered into. OLLEY v MARLBOROUGH COURT HOTEL [1949]

-          Previous course of dealings: There may be an implied knowledge of the clause where there has been previous consistent course of conduct. KENDALL & SONS v LILLICO & SONS LTD [1969]

-          Unusual exclusions: Greater notice is required for unusual exclusion clauses. SPURLING v BRADSHAW [1956]

-          Reasonable Notice: What is reasonable as regards the ordinary adult individual, capable of reading English. PARKER v SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY [1877]

-          Contractual document: The item in which said exclusion clauses are contained, must be regarded as a contractual document. CHAPELTON v BARRY UDC [1940]

Construction – once it has been decided that an exclusion clause exists within a contract, the courts must then decide whether that clause covers the breach that has occurred. The clause is being ‘constructed’ or ‘interpreted’ to determine its scope.

Contra proferentem rule – an exclusion clause that is ambiguous will be construed against the interests of the party who imposed that clause.

Difficulty is caused where the defendant seeks to exclude liability for negligence in the performance of a contract. Hollier v Rambler Motors [1972]. The plaintiff’s car was at the defendant’s premises when it was damaged by fire, caused by the defendant’s negligence. There was a clause in the contract which stated ‘The company is not responsible for damage caused by fire to customer’s cars on the premises.’ The court held that if the defendant’s wanted to exclude liability for his own negligence, then this should have been done explicitly. Customers would not ordinarily assume that the car company would cause such fires.

Fundamental Breach – some breaches in contract are so serious that no exclusion clause can cover them. 

This is the DOCTRINE OF FUNDAMENTAL BREACH. Two forms:

1. Fundamental TERMS - certain terms are so fundamental that there cannot be exclusion for breach of them. For example if the contract was for the sale of peas and beans were provided instead; or if coal was provided instead of potatoes. This deviation from the basic contractual obligation means that exclusion clauses should not be allowed to cover them as to do so would make a mockery of the concept. These are fundamental terms which must be adhered to.

2. Overall Effects – exclusion clauses cannot apply if the breach was serious enough to destroy the entire contract. Karsales v Wallis [1956] 2 All ER 866 was about the supply of a car which when inspected by the plaintiff was in good condition but when arrived had many faults and was in a non-driveable state and had to be towed. The defendant’s relied on a clause which said that the owner did not tell or imply the condition, warranty, roadworthiness, age etc. However the courts said that since the defendant’s performance was not one that could have been contemplated by the contract, there was a breach of a fundamental term and therefore exclusion clauses were not applicable. 

AV Dicey on Parliamentary Sovereignty

AV Dicey believed there are 3 basic rules that define Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK. These were known by many as the Diceian definition. The first is that Parliament is competent to make or unmake any law it wishes. Thus its legislative competence is unlimited. Parliament frequently make laws, but when we speak of Parliament being able to ‘unmake’ laws, what we mean in essence, is that Parliament have the power and the ability to repeal any previous Act of Parliament, or to legislate against common law. Dicey’s second rule is that no person or body has the power or capability to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. The Crown for instance, cannot suspend or execute laws without Parliament permission, as stated in the Bill of Rights 1689. And the courts cannot question the validity of an act that has been through the legislative process (passed through both Houses of Parliament) and received Royal assent. This is known as the “enrolled bill role”. Finally, no Parliament can be bound by a predecessor, or may bind a successor. This is an important aspect of Parliamentary Sovereignty because if Parliament is to remain sovereign then its absolute freedom should not be restricted by the decisions earlier Parliaments made.

Judicial Review

When an individual feels that they have suffered a grievance as the result of a decision or procedure followed out by a public body, they may qualify for Judicial Review. This is a process by which the courts scrutinise the decisions of government ministers, inferior courts, tribunals and other administrative bodies to ensure that they have not acted irrationally, illegally, or committed some procedural impropriety. 

CCSU v The Minister for the Civil Service HL [1984] 

Also known as the GCHQ case – held that the Royal Prerogative was subject to Judicial Review. Margret Thatcher’s government decided that employees of the GCHQ would not be allowed to join a trade union for national security reasons. After much protest the government did not change its mind and gave its employees the option between £1000 + their job, or dismissal. This decision was enforced by the Royal Prerogative, which the High Court of Justice deemed invalid due to the lack of consultation beforehand. The Court of Appeal decided that national security issues trumped any problems of propriety; also adding that it is the executive’s right to judge national security and not the right of the judiciary. The case then went to the House of Lords where it failed; they said that the Royal Prerogative was generally subject to judicial review – national security was one of the only exceptions. Previous law had stated that prerogative powers were not in any way subject to Judicial Review; the GCHQ case identified that the application of Judicial Review would be dependent on the nature of the government’s powers, not their source. Lord Fraser said that whilst the courts would not by default accept a government statement that there was a national security issue, it was a “matter of evidence” and the evidence here showed the government to be correct.

This case is highly important as it set out that although Royal Prerogative for national security reasons is considered outside the scope of the courts, most other uses of the Royal Prerogative are now judicially reviewable in some form.

In the CCSU case, Lord Diplock highlighted 3 bases for intervention:

1.      Illegality – “the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it.”

In determining the legality, the court must consider the area over which the power is given. Presumptions of statutory interpretation such as ‘a body has no power to act retrospectively’ and ‘a body has no power to restrict a person’s access to the courts.’ Determining the scope of a body’s power is far from being mechanical but involves the court in making value judgements; if any authority exercises power outside of this area, that action will be invalid. Alternatively, a statue might provide that power must be exercised by a particular person or by someone with specific qualifications. If power is exercised by another it may be an ULTRA VIRES act which is a nullity and the act may be considered illegal.

Allingham v The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries HC [1948] – minister had statutory power to give instruction and direction regarding agricultural land. He was allowed to pass some of that power to a committee to make decisions; the committee then gave power to an executive officer who gave instructions to a farmer as to what he could grow on his land (only sugar). The farmer failed to comply with this instruction and the court held that only the minister or committee had the power under the statute to issue such a directive.

The courts must take into account (1) The nature of the power; (2) The character of the person. Obviously if the power is of a routine nature or simply part of procedure, the courts will be much more willing to allow the use of power by a sub-delegate than if there is a strong element of discretion involved. Judicial and legislative powers are not allowed to be subject to sub-delegation; however when a minister acts through his civil servants, there is no delegation.

2.      Irrationality – “so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question… could have arrived at it.”

Unreasonableness: so unreasonable that no reasonable person would agree with it. For example ‘we will not employ anyone with red hair’. The leading case for this is Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp CA [1948] where a cinema said no children under 15 were allowed in the cinema on Sundays. The court said they could not overturn the decision simply because they disagreed with it – therefore the claim failed on the grounds that the rule was not ‘outrageous’.

Irrelevant Considerations: In the Padfield case, the minister had the power to refer complaints to the committee but decided not to on one occasion as he feared the complaint could be politically damaging for the government at the time. The court said this was an irrelevant consideration which constituted an unlawful decision.

Improper Purpose: if a public body exercises its statutory power for an improper purpose the courts can intervene. In the Padfield case the minister had discretion as to whether or not to take a complaint to the committee, however this discretion was not unlimited and it should have been used to promote the policy and objects of the enabling Act. In the Congrieve case the minister was given statutory power to revoke television licenses; he revoked them early to avoid increase, claiming he had unrestricted power – the court said he had acted ultra vires in using his power for improper purpose.

Failure to give reasons: Where the individual can provide no good reason, unreasonableness is usually inferred. Failure to give reasons may also constitute procedural impropriety.

Beyond Wednesbury unreasonableness: Use of the ECHR Article 13. A court, when deciding whether a decision was unreasonable, might consider whether it was proportionate. Lord Steyn said that although the convention calls for a more exacting standard of review, it remains that the judge is not the primary decision maker.

Proportionality: Recognised in the Alconbury case. Balance – whether the means justify the ends. “Balance…between the adverse effects…and the purpose which the authority is seeking to pursue.”

“Whether the legislative objective was sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right.”

The court will consider the balance struck by the decision-maker, as well as whether or not it is reasonable or rational. Proportionality and the ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ did not always produce the same result.

3.      Procedural Impropriety – has the procedure been followed?

-Breach of Procedural Requirement: Express and Implied

EXPRESS PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT: Two categories of express requirement are Mandatory and Directory. Mandatory refers to a requirement given by an authority; a prerogative order. Only if the breach is considered to be ‘mandatory’ procedural requirement will non-compliance affect the validity of the exercise of power. Breach of ‘directory’ procedural requirement will not affect validity. Lord Hailsham has criticised the rigid distinction between the two categories and said that the effects of the same breach may differ hugely in different circumstances. 3 criteria were proposed by Balcombe LJ, which must be considered when determining the effect of non-compliance:

(1) The importance of the relevant procedural requirement;

(2) The relation of that requirement to the general object intended to be secured by the Act;

(3) The relevant circumstances to the case.

IMPLIED PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT: e.g. consultation; requirement to give reasons and; duty to follow a fair procedure. Usually linked to legitimate expectation arising out of a previous course of dealing between parties. E.g. In the CCSU case, members had previously been informed when terms and conditions changed in relation to their employment, and this gave rise to a legitimate expectation that they would be informed if the terms were to change again.